Authors
Annette Alstadsæter, Niels Johannesen, Ségal Le Guern Herry, Gabriel Zucman
Publication date
2022/2/1
Journal
Journal of Public Economics
Volume
206
Pages
104587
Publisher
North-Holland
Description
Exploiting rich administrative data and salient policy variation, we study the substitution between illegal tax evasion and legal tax avoidance. By increasing its enforcement effort, the Norwegian government pushed many wealthy individuals to disclose assets previously hidden abroad. We find that the taxes paid by these individuals rise 30% at the time of disclosure and that the rise is sustained over time. After stopping to evade, taxpayers do not start avoiding more. Our results suggest that cracking down on evasion by the wealthy can be an effective way to raise tax revenue, increase tax progressivity, and ultimately reduce inequality.
Scholar articles
A Alstadsæter, N Johannesen, SLG Herry, G Zucman - Journal of Public Economics, 2022