Authors
Angel Sanchez, Jose A Cuesta
Publication date
2005/7/21
Journal
Journal of Theoretical Biology
Volume
235
Issue
2
Pages
233-240
Publisher
Academic Press
Description
The fact that humans cooperate with non-kin in large groups, or with people they will never meet again, is a long-standing evolutionary puzzle. Altruism, the capacity to perform costly acts that confer benefits on others, is at the core of cooperative behavior. Behavioral experiments show that humans have a predisposition to cooperate with others and to punish non-cooperators at personal cost (so-called strong reciprocity) which, according to standard evolutionary game theory arguments, cannot arise from selection acting on individuals. This has led to the suggestion of group and cultural selection as the only mechanisms that can explain the evolutionary origin of human altruism. We introduce an agent-based model inspired on the Ultimatum Game, that allows us to go beyond the limitations of standard evolutionary game theory and show that individual selection can indeed give rise to strong reciprocity. Our results …
Total citations
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Scholar articles
A Sánchez, JA Cuesta - Journal of theoretical biology, 2005