Authors
Xavier Freixas, Roger Guesnerie, Jean Tirole
Publication date
1985/4/1
Journal
The review of economic studies
Volume
52
Issue
2
Pages
173-191
Publisher
Wiley-Blackwell
Description
Central planning of production is usually performed under asymmetric information which leads to use of an incentive scheme. As the planner revises the scheme over time to take into account information provided by the firm's performance, this induces firms to underproduce to avoid more demanding schedules in the future—the ratchet effect. This paper explores this phenomenon under the realistic assumption that the planner cannot commit himself to a revision procedure. We show that the ratchet effect exists, in the sense that the planner may choose a scheme which is suboptimal from a static viewpoint in order to induce revelation, with the marginal price of output exceeding its optimal static value.
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Scholar articles
X Freixas, R Guesnerie, J Tirole - The review of economic studies, 1985