Authors
Jan Zilinsky, Yannis Theocharis, Franziska Pradel, Marina Tulin, Claes de Vreese, Toril Aalberg, Ana Sofía Cardenal, Nicoleta Corbu, Frank Esser, Luisa Gehle, Denis Halagiera, Michael Hameleers, David Nicolas Hopmann, Karolina Koc-Michalska, Jörg Matthes, Christian Schemer, Václav Štětka, Jesper Strömbäck, Ludovic Terren, Sergio Splendore, James Stanyer, Agnieszka Stępińska, Peter Van Aelst, Alon Zoizner
Publication date
2024/5/23
Journal
Political Communication
Pages
1-22
Publisher
Routledge
Description
Conventional wisdom suggests that social media, especially when used by authoritarian powers with nefarious aims, leaves citizens of democratic countries vulnerable to psychological influence campaigns. But such concerns overlook predispositions among recipients of false claims to reject (or to endorse) conspiratorial narratives. Analyzing responses from a survey fielded in 19 countries, we find that it is a preexisting conspiracy outlook at the individual level, more so than media diets, which consistently predicts rating Russia’s pretenses for the invasion as more accurate. In all countries, individuals who view the world in general with a conspiratorial mindset are more likely to believe war-related disinformation. Receiving news via YouTube, Facebook, or TikTok is also associated with greater belief in Russian narratives justifying the invasion in several countries, but these relationships are weaker compared to …
Scholar articles
J Zilinsky, Y Theocharis, F Pradel, M Tulin, C de Vreese… - Political Communication, 2024