Authors
Olivier Armantier
Publication date
2004/2/1
Journal
Games and Economic Behavior
Volume
46
Issue
2
Pages
221-239
Publisher
Academic Press
Description
A common value auction experiment is run to compare the relative influence of observation and experience on learning. It is shown that the ex-post observation of opponents' actions and payoffs homogenizes behavior and accelerates learning toward the Nash equilibrium. Additionally, experiential, and observational learning are both relevant and of comparable magnitude. A general reinforcement model for continuous strategies, encompassing choice reinforcement learning, direction learning and payoff dependent imitation, performs well in explaining the experimental data, and it dominates competing models such as the reinforcement of best response strategies.
Total citations
20042005200620072008200920102011201220132014201520162017201820192020202120222023202422643347753124412512
Scholar articles