Authors
Randolph P Beatty, Howard Bunsis, John RM Hand
Publication date
1998/11/1
Journal
Journal of Financial Economics
Volume
50
Issue
2
Pages
151-186
Publisher
North-Holland
Description
We document that an SEC investigation of an underwriter imposes indirect penalties on the underwriter and its past clients, particularly IPO clients. Targeted underwriters experience large declines in IPO market share and increased regulatory scrutiny and client risk after an SEC investigation is announced. Stock prices of clients decline significantly. We attribute these effects to a sudden deterioration in the value of the underwriter's reputation capital, suggesting that the general assumption in prior IPO research that underwriter reputation is stationary may be inappropriate. Our results also suggest that the SEC's power to institute investigations should be considered when designing optimal securities regulation.
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