Authors
Octavio Amorim Neto, Gary W Cox
Publication date
1997/1/1
Journal
American Journal of Political Science
Pages
149-174
Publisher
University of Wisconsin Press
Description
A classic question in political science concerns what determines the number of parties that compete in a given polity. Broadly speaking, there are two approaches to answering this question, one that emphasizes the role of electoral laws in structuring coalitional incentives, and another that emphasizes the importance of preexisting social cleavages. In this paper, we view the number of parties as a product of the interaction between these two forces, following Powell (1982) and Ordeshook and Shvetsova (1994). The effective number of parties in a polity should be a multiplicative rather than an additive function of the permissiveness of the electoral system and the heterogeneity of the society. Multiple regression on cross-sectional aggregate electoral statistics. Unlike previous studies, we (1) do not confine attention to developed democracies; (2) explicitly control for the influence of presidential elections, taking …
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