Authors
Jonathan I Flombaum, Laurie R Santos, Marc D Hauser
Publication date
2002/3/1
Source
Trends in Cognitive Sciences
Volume
6
Issue
3
Pages
106-108
Publisher
Elsevier
Description
Namely, we argue that neurobiological data cannot be used to bring a case against the thesis of psychological modularity, whether in the case of memory and learning, or otherwise. Data of this sort, although relevant to a discussion of the principles underlying modularity, are orthogonal to a discussion of whether or not modularity, in the psychological sense, exists in the first place.
As Bolhuis and Macphail point out, much of the interest in the idea of modularity comes from the work of the philosopher Jerry Fodor [3]. Since their original conception in 1983, Fodor’s ideas have generated many debates and undergone many revisions and reincarnations [4]. Evolutionary psychologists, for example, have argued that most psychological systems, not just the perceptual ones, are modular, and that these modules have been shaped by natural selection [5]. In this article, we stick with Fodor’s original conception of modularity …
Total citations
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Scholar articles
JI Flombaum, LR Santos, MD Hauser - Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 2002