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The challenges between IRAN and AFGHANISTAN have different aspects. Definitely, with water as the common point, the production of OPIUM in AFGHANISTAN and saving the environment of the eastern IRAN are the most important ones. This research work aims to assess a new approach in the water-related interactions between IRAN and AFGHANISTAN using the sequential and issue linkage methods of game theory. A number of incentives like transfer of agricultural technologies are evaluated for possible decrease in OPIUM cultivation simultaneously achieving more pay off for AFGHANISTAN and increased inflows to IRAN. The results showed that the successfulness of this STRATEGIC COOPERATION is highly dependent on OPIUM price such that the incentives are efficient only for prices up to about $200 per kg of OPIUM. For the higher prices their capacity reduces drastically. The research highlighted how issue linkage can be useful in international relations to solve a long lasting transboundary water conflict and achievement of a win-win solution for the riparian parties.