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Pro-social acts are at the core of human relationships and proper functioning of society. Still, human pro-sociality is seen as unique, reaching beyond the kinship-based helping that is found in other species, such as primates. This uniqueness of human pro-sociality is recognised as closely related to another phenomenon specific to humans, and crucial for the maintenance of social relationships; namely, the presence of moral emotions. This thesis investigated emotional underpinnings of human pro-sociality after moral or social transgressions. The particular focus was placed on guilt – the emotion seen as most prototypical morally, and anger, its’ often under-studied relative. These two emotions have a unique standing in the context of the pro-sociality following from transgressions. They are associated with the perception of harm, injustice and norm violation that are core to transgression situations, and an action tendency to improve such situation, which behaving in a pro-social manner can be seen as. Nevertheless, only a few studies have examined guilt and anger jointly, in the context of pro-sociality, which stresses the need for an investigation of their relative influences. This thesis aimed to fill this gap in the literature. Chapter 1 introduces the topic of emotions and its role for pro-sociality, starting with the initial concept of emotions as the continuum of positive and negative affect, followed by more recent conceptualisation of emotions, in terms of their specificity and uniqueness. A particular emphasis is placed on the place of guilt and anger in the family of moral emotions, and their specific characteristics. Moreover, the role of pro-sociality as a …