Authors
Klodiana Istrefi, Florens Odendahl, Giulia Sestieri
Publication date
2021/11/19
Journal
Research Update/Banco de España, Fall 2021, p. 17-19
Publisher
Banco de España
Description
Even though the fed does not have an explicit financial stability objective extending beyond its supervisory responsibilities, the public speeches of fed officials, during the period 1997 to 2013, reveal that a higher speaking time or a higher negative tone on financial stability topics correlate with a more accommodative monetary policy stance. in contrast, communication on housing topics correlates with a tighter policy stance. these results are mainly driven by the information in speeches of regional fed presidents.
The Federal Reserve does not have an explicit financial stability objective that extends beyond its supervisory responsibilities. Nonetheless, a narrow interpretation of the dual mandate, ie ignoring any interactions between monetary policy and financial stability risks does not seem credible (see Kashyap and Siegert, 2020). Indeed, even in the absence of an institutionalised communication strategy, Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) members do express their views on financial stability risks and policy consequences through informal public remarks.
Total citations
Scholar articles
K Istrefi, F Odendahl, G Sestieri - Research Update/Banco de España, Fall 2021, p. 17 …, 2021