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Thought experiments play various roles in philosophy. Often, they have anargumentative function: The judgments they elicit bear on some philosophical debate. The Gettier case, theGödel case, the Twin Earth case, the Frankfurt case, etc., illustrate the argumentative function ofthought experiments. Much of recent metaphilosophy (e.g., Williamson, 2007; Machery, 2017) examines whether and how thought experiments can fulfill this argumentative function. But thought experiments also have less controversial functions. Sometimes they are just meant to illustrate a definition or a theory: Arguably, Davidson’s swampman case is only meant to illustrate (not to support) the proposition that the content of thoughts depends on historical facts.Another function of cases is to provoke the reader, that is, to elicit puzzlement in order tomotivate philosophical inquiry. Metaphysical cases such as the statue of clay case are often meant to fulfill this provocative function. To fulfill a provocative function, a thought experiment must meet the following condition (which we will call “Ambivalence”): Readers should feel inclined to assert two prima facie inconsistent propositions. This ambivalence is instrumental in leading readers to philosophizeabout the philosophical issue raised by this thought experiment (be it identity, persistence, constitution, etc.). Ambivalence refers to a psychological fact—that is, it is a psychological factthat readers are so inclined—and psychological methods can be used to assess whether a thought experiment successfully provokes. A thought experiment fails to fulfill its provocative function if it elicits a single, obvious answer. If a provocative …