Authors
David H Wolpert, Kagan Tumer
Publication date
2001/10/31
Journal
Advances in Complex Systems
Volume
4
Issue
02n03
Pages
265-279
Publisher
World Scientific Publishing Company
Description
We consider the problem of designing (perhaps massively distributed) collectives of computational processes to maximize a provided "world utility" function. We consider this problem when the behavior of each process in the collective can be cast as striving to maximize its own payoff utility function. For such cases the central design issue is how to initialize/update those payoff utility functions of the individual processes so as to induce behavior of the entire collective having good values of the world utility. Traditional "team game" approaches to this problem simply assign to each process the world utility as its payoff utility function. In previous work we used the "Collective Intelligence" (COIN) framework to derive a better choice of payoff utility functions, one that results in world utility performance up to orders of magnitude superior to that ensuing from the use of the team game utility. In this paper, we extend these …
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DH Wolpert, K Tumer - Advances in Complex Systems, 2001