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Gossip, which involves sharing information about absent others, has been identified as an effective solution to free rider problems in situations with conflicting interests between self and others. Yet, the information transmitted via gossip can be biased, because gossipers may send dishonest information about others for personal gains. Such dishonest gossip makes reputation-based cooperation more difficult to evolve. In which situations are people likely to share honest or dishonest gossip? In this theoretical review, we use formal models to provide the theoretical foundation for individuals’ gossip strategies in situations where the gossiper has varying levels of fitness interdependence with the target and/or the recipient. Our models across four different games (ie, stag-hunt game, snowdrift game, helping game, and punishment game) illustrate that the gossiper’s action will be determined by (a) the gossiper’s fitness interdependence with the recipient and the target, and (b) the marginal cost/benefit in terms of payoff differences between two possible game actions for the recipient and the target (ie, game type). Our models suggest a simple rule that gossipers can use to make optimal decisions even under noise. We discuss empirical examples that support the predictions of our model and potential extensions.