View article

In 2011, the inauguration of a semi-civilian government led by General Thein Sein marked the start of an ambitious reform agenda that gave rise to widespread hopes that Myanmar’s long civil war was finally coming to an end. 1 Subsequently, economic and political liberalization and a renewed peace process fundamentally reshaped both the political landscape in Myanmar and its international relations. Further fueling optimism, the 2015 general election was won by the National League for Democracy, the party led by Aung San Suu Kyi, and the new government took office without interference from the previous government or the Myanmar Armed Forces, the Tatmadaw (Thawnghmung 2017). Yet, in 2021, the military took back power in a coup d’état, ending the decade of reforms (Jordt et al. 2021; Thawnghmung and Noah 2021; Pedersen 2022; Ye Myo Hein 2022). While Myanmar’s transition from a full-fledged military junta to a quasidemocratic government faced numerous challenges (Aung-Thwin 2014), many conflict-affected areas nevertheless saw a drastic reduction in violence during this reform period. This was the case in the two regions that we focus on in this chapter: Kayah State and Mon State. In both of these areas, ceasefires between the main armed insurgent groups and the government held from 2012 until the 2021 military coup, and the number of battle-related deaths was close to zero (UCDP 2018). According to conventional definitions, these regions, during this decade of reforms, were no longer scenes of war. However, this narrative of successful peacebuilding is troubled when read alongside local narratives that capture …