Authors
Shuping Chen, Dawn Matsumoto, Shiva Rajgopal
Publication date
2011/2/1
Journal
Journal of Accounting and Economics
Volume
51
Issue
1-2
Pages
134-150
Publisher
North-Holland
Description
We investigate firms that stop providing earnings guidance (“stoppers”) either by publicly announcing their decision (“announcers”) or doing so quietly (“quiet stoppers”). Relative to firms that continue guiding, stoppers have poorer prior performance, more uncertain operating environments, and fewer informed investors. Announcers commit to non-disclosure because they (i) do not expect to report future good news or (ii) have lower incentives to guide due to the presence of long-term investors. The three-day return around the announcement is negative. Stoppers subsequently experience increases in analyst forecast dispersion and decreases in forecast accuracy but no change in return volatility or analyst following.
Total citations
20102011201220132014201520162017201820192020202120222023202451518273032322633283639354217
Scholar articles