Authors
Sushil Bikhchandani
Publication date
1988/10/1
Journal
Journal of Economic Theory
Volume
46
Issue
1
Pages
97-119
Publisher
Academic Press
Description
A model in which two bidders take part in a series of second-price, comon-value auctions is examined. The question of an optimal auction from an auctioneer's standpoint, in a repeated auction setting, is partially addressed. It is shown that the results from single auction models do not carry over to repeated auctions, when one of the bidders is endowed with a reputation for bidding aggressively. Second-price auctions with two bidders are highly susceptible to manipulative behaviour by an aggressive bidder, and yield much lower revenues to the auctioneer.
Total citations
Scholar articles
S Bikhchandani - Journal of Economic Theory, 1988
S Bikhchandani - … LIBRARY OF CRITICAL WRITINGS IN ECONOMICS, 2000