Authors
Sushil Bikhchandani, Philip A Haile, John G Riley
Publication date
2002/1/1
Journal
Games and Economic Behavior
Volume
38
Issue
1
Pages
19-27
Publisher
Academic Press
Description
We characterize the set of perfect Bayesian equilibria in symmetric separating strategies in the model of English auctions given by P. R. Milgrom and R. J. Weber (1982, Econometrica50, 1089–1122). There is a continuum of such equilibria. The equilibrium derived by Milgrom and Weber is that in which bids are maximal. Only in the case of pure private values does a restriction to weakly undominated strategies select a unique equilibrium. This has important implications for empirical studies of English auctions, particularly outside the pure private values paradigm. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D44, D82.
Total citations
Scholar articles
S Bikhchandani, PA Haile, JG Riley - Games and Economic Behavior, 2002