Authors
Sushil Bikhchandani, David Hirshleifer, Ivo Welch
Publication date
1992/10/1
Journal
Journal of political Economy
Volume
100
Issue
5
Pages
992-1026
Publisher
The University of Chicago Press
Description
An informational cascade occurs when it is optimal for an individual, having observed the actions of those ahead of him, to follow the behavior of the preceding individual without regard to his own information. We argue that localized conformity of behavior and the fragility of mass behaviors can be explained by informational cascades.
Total citations
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Scholar articles
S Bikhchandani, D Hirshleifer, I Welch - Journal of political Economy, 1992
S Bikhchandani, D Hirshleifer, I Welch - 2010