Articles with public access mandates - Thomas MariottiLearn more
Available somewhere: 12
Researcher’s dilemma
C Bobtcheff, J Bolte, T Mariotti
The Review of Economic Studies 84 (3), 969-1014, 2017
Mandates: European Commission
Nonexclusive competition under adverse selection
A Attar, T Mariotti, F Salanié
Theoretical Economics 9 (1), 1-40, 2014
Mandates: European Commission
Regulating insurance markets: multiple contracting and adverse selection
A Attar, T Mariotti, F Salanié
International Economic Review 63 (3), 981-1020, 2022
Mandates: European Commission, Agence Nationale de la Recherche, Government of Italy
Entry-proofness and discriminatory pricing under adverse selection
A Attar, T Mariotti, F Salanié
American Economic Review 111 (8), 2623-2659, 2021
Mandates: Agence Nationale de la Recherche, Government of Italy
Information nudges and self-control
T Mariotti, N Schweizer, N Szech, J von Wangenheim
Management Science 69 (4), 2182-2197, 2023
Mandates: German Research Foundation, Agence Nationale de la Recherche
On competitive nonlinear pricing
A Attar, T Mariotti, F Salanié
Theoretical Economics 14 (1), 297-343, 2019
Mandates: European Commission
The social costs of side trading
A Attar, T Mariotti, F Salanié
The Economic Journal 130 (630), 1608-1622, 2020
Mandates: Agence Nationale de la Recherche
The War of Attrition under Uncertainty: Theory and Robust Testable Implications
JP Décamps, F Gensbittel, T Mariotti
CESifo Working Paper, 2023
Mandates: Agence Nationale de la Recherche
Competing mechanisms and folk theorems: Two examples
A Attar, E Campioni, T Mariotti, G Piaser
Games and Economic Behavior 125, 79-93, 2021
Mandates: Agence Nationale de la Recherche, Government of Italy
Investment Timing and Technological Breakthroughs
JP Décamps, F Gensbittel, T Mariotti
Mathematics of Operations Research, 2024
Mandates: Agence Nationale de la Recherche
Keeping the agents in the dark: private disclosures in competing mechanisms
A Attar, E Campioni, T Mariotti, A Pavan
CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP16807, 2021
Mandates: Agence Nationale de la Recherche, Government of Italy
Competitive nonlinear pricing under adverse selection
A Attar, T Mariotti, F Salanié
Mandates: Agence Nationale de la Recherche, Government of Italy
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