Articles with public access mandates - Jordi MassóLearn more
Available somewhere: 31
Comparing generalized median voter schemes according to their manipulability
RP Arribillaga, J Massó
Theoretical Economics 11 (2), 547-586, 2016
Mandates: Government of Spain, Government of Argentina
Matching markets under (in)complete information
L Ehlers, J Massó
Journal of economic theory 157, 295-314, 2015
Mandates: Government of Spain
On strategy-proofness and symmetric single-peakedness
J Massó, I Moreno de Barreda
Games and Economic Behavior 72 (2), 467-484, 2011
Mandates: Government of Spain
The multiple-partners assignment game with heterogeneous sales and multi-unit demands: competitive equilibria
D Jaume, J Massó, A Neme
Mathematical Methods of operations research 76, 161-187, 2012
Mandates: Government of Spain
On strategy-proofness and the salience of single-peakedness
S Chatterji, J Massó
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica, 2015
Mandates: Government of Spain
On cost sharing in the provision of a binary and excludable public good
J Massó, A Nicolo, A Sen, T Sharma, L Ülkü
Journal of economic theory 155, 30-49, 2015
Mandates: Government of Spain
On obvious strategy-proofness and single-peakedness
RP Arribillaga, J Massó, A Neme
Journal of Economic Theory 186, 104992, 2020
Mandates: Government of Spain, Government of Argentina
All sequential allotment rules are obviously strategy‐proof
RP Arribillaga, J Massó, A Neme
Theoretical Economics 18 (3), 1023-1061, 2023
Mandates: Government of Spain, Government of Argentina
Comparing voting by committees according to their manipulability
RP Arribillaga, J Massó
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 9 (4), 74-107, 2017
Mandates: Government of Spain, Government of Argentina
The Theory of stable allocations and the practice of market design. The Nobel Prize in Economics 2012 for Alvin E. Roth and Lloyd S. Shapley
J Massó
Contributions to science, 103-112, 2016
Mandates: Government of Spain
On the structure of cooperative and competitive solutions for a generalized assignment game
RP Arribillaga, J Massó, A Neme
Journal of Applied Mathematics 2014 (1), 190614, 2014
Mandates: Government of Spain, Government of Argentina
False-name-proof and strategy-proof voting rules under separable preferences
F Fioravanti, J Massó
Theory and Decision, 1-18, 2024
Mandates: Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research
Not all majority-based social choice functions are obviously strategy-proof
RP Arribillaga, J Massó, A Neme
Mimeo, Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona, 2017
Mandates: Government of Spain, Government of Argentina
On cooperative solutions of a generalized assignment game: Limit theorems to the set of competitive equilibria
J Massó, A Neme
Journal of economic theory 154, 187-215, 2014
Mandates: Government of Spain, Government of Argentina
On strategy-proofness and semilattice single-peakedness
AG Bonifacio, J Massó
Games and Economic Behavior 124, 219-238, 2020
Mandates: Government of Spain, Government of Argentina
The division problem under constraints
G Bergantiños, J Massó, A Neme
Games and Economic Behavior 89, 56-77, 2015
Mandates: Government of Spain, Government of Argentina
On the invariance of the set of Core matchings with respect to preference profiles
R Martínez, J Massó, A Neme, J Oviedo
Games and Economic Behavior 74 (2), 588-600, 2012
Mandates: Government of Spain
Les aportacions de John F. Nash a l'economia: equilibri i negociació
J Massó
Butlletí de la Societat Catalana de Matemàtiques, 73-94, 2017
Mandates: Government of Spain
Stable partitions in many division problems: the proportional and the sequential dictator solutions
G Bergantiños, J Massó, I Moreno de Barrera, A Neme
Theory and Decision 79 (2), 227-250, 2015
Mandates: Government of Spain, Government of Argentina
On societies choosing social outcomes, and their memberships: internal stability and consistency
G Bergantiños, J Massó, A Neme
Theory and Decision 84, 83-97, 2018
Mandates: Government of Spain, Government of Argentina
Publication and funding information is determined automatically by a computer program