Balasubramanian Sivan

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Shuchi ChawlaUniversity of Wisconsin - MadisonDirección de correo verificada de cs.wisc.edu
nikhil r. devanurAmazonDirección de correo verificada de nikhildevanur.com
Renato Paes LemeGoogle ResearchDirección de correo verificada de cs.cornell.edu
Jason HartlineProfessor of Computer Science, Northwestern U.Dirección de correo verificada de northwestern.edu
David MalecPostdoc, Department of Economics, University of MarylandDirección de correo verificada de umd.edu
Vasilis SyrgkanisAssistant Professor, Stanford UniversityDirección de correo verificada de stanford.edu
Anna R. KarlinBill & Melinda Gates Chair and Professor of Computer Science and Engineering, University ofDirección de correo verificada de cs.washington.edu
Nick GravinITCS, Shanghai University of Finance and EconomicsDirección de correo verificada de microsoft.com
Denis CharlesMicrosoft ResearchDirección de correo verificada de microsoft.com
Moshe BabaioffHebrew University of JerusalemDirección de correo verificada de mail.huji.ac.il
Mohammad Hossein BateniResearch scientist, GoogleDirección de correo verificada de cs.princeton.edu
Nima HaghpanahAssociate Professor, Penn State UniversityDirección de correo verificada de psu.edu
Morteza ZadimoghaddamResearch Scientist at GoogleDirección de correo verificada de google.com
C.Pandu RanganProfessor, Department of Computer Science and Engg, IIT-Madras, India.Dirección de correo verificada de cse.iitm.ac.in
Brendan LucierMicrosoft ResearchDirección de correo verificada de microsoft.com
Hu FuUniversity of British ColumbiaDirección de correo verificada de cs.ubc.ca
Omer TamuzCaltechDirección de correo verificada de caltech.edu

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Balasubramanian Sivan

Google Research, New York

Dirección de correo verificada de google.com - Página principal

Algorithmic Game Theory and Approximation algorithms


Título Ordenar por citas Ordenar por año Ordenar por título	Citado por Citado por	Año
Multi-parameter mechanism design and sequential posted pricing S Chawla, JD Hartline, DL Malec, B Sivan Proceedings of the forty-second ACM symposium on Theory of computing, 311-320, 2010	660	2010
Optimal crowdsourcing contests S Chawla, JD Hartline, B Sivan Games and Economic Behavior 113, 80-96, 2019	219	2019
The power of randomness in bayesian optimal mechanism design S Chawla, DL Malec, B Sivan Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Electronic commerce, 149-158, 2010	198	2010
Near optimal online algorithms and fast approximation algorithms for resource allocation problems NR Devanur, K Jain, B Sivan, CA Wilkens Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce, 29-38, 2011	193	2011
Near optimal online algorithms and fast approximation algorithms for resource allocation problems NR Devanur, K Jain, B Sivan, CA Wilkens Journal of the ACM (JACM) 66 (1), 1-41, 2019	97	2019
Perfect bayesian equilibria in repeated sales NR Devanur, Y Peres, B Sivan Proceedings of the twenty-sixth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete …, 2014	60	2014
Strategizing against no-regret learners Y Deng, J Schneider, B Sivan Advances in neural information processing systems 32, 2019	55	2019
Asymptotically optimal algorithm for stochastic adwords NR Devanur, B Sivan, Y Azar Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 388-404, 2012	54	2012
Towards optimal algorithms for prediction with expert advice N Gravin, Y Peres, B Sivan Proceedings of the twenty-seventh annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete …, 2016	52	2016
Prior-independent mechanisms for scheduling S Chawla, JD Hartline, D Malec, B Sivan Proceedings of the forty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing …, 2013	40	2013
Bayesian algorithmic mechanism design S Chawla, B Sivan ACM SIGecom Exchanges 13 (1), 5-49, 2014	36	2014
Improved approximations for free-order prophets and second-price auctions H Beyhaghi, N Golrezaei, RP Leme, M Pal, B Sivan arXiv preprint arXiv:1807.03435, 2018	35	2018
Stability of service under time-of-use pricing S Chawla, NR Devanur, AE Holroyd, AR Karlin, JB Martin, B Sivan Proceedings of the 49th Annual ACM SIGACT Symposium on Theory of Computing …, 2017	35	2017
Simple pricing schemes for consumers with evolving values S Chawla, NR Devanur, AR Karlin, B Sivan Proceedings of the twenty-seventh annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete …, 2016	32	2016
Variable decomposition for prophet inequalities and optimal ordering A Liu, RP Leme, M Pál, J Schneider, B Sivan arXiv preprint arXiv:2004.10163, 2020	29	2020
Prior-free dynamic auctions with low regret buyers Y Deng, J Schneider, B Sivan Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 32, 2019	29	2019
Strategizing against learners in bayesian games Y Mansour, M Mohri, J Schneider, B Sivan Conference on Learning Theory, 5221-5252, 2022	28	2022
Approximately efficient bilateral trade Y Deng, J Mao, B Sivan, K Wang Proceedings of the 54th Annual ACM SIGACT Symposium on Theory of Computing …, 2022	28	2022
Why do competitive markets converge to first-price auctions? R Paes Leme, B Sivan, Y Teng Proceedings of The Web Conference 2020, 596-605, 2020	27	2020
Improved revenue bounds for posted-price and second-price mechanisms H Beyhaghi, N Golrezaei, RP Leme, M Pál, B Sivan Operations research 69 (6), 1805-1822, 2021	25	2021

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