Favoritism in asymmetric contests: Head starts and handicaps R Kirkegaard Games and Economic Behavior 76 (1), 226-248, 2012 | 140 | 2012 |
A mechanism design approach to ranking asymmetric auctions R Kirkegaard Econometrica 80 (5), 2349-2364, 2012 | 82 | 2012 |
Buy‐out prices in auctions: seller competition and multi‐unit demands R Kirkegaard, PB Overgaard The RAND Journal of Economics 39 (3), 770-789, 2008 | 61 | 2008 |
Asymmetric first price auctions R Kirkegaard Journal of Economic Theory 144 (4), 1617-1635, 2009 | 60 | 2009 |
A unifying approach to incentive compatibility in moral hazard problems R Kirkegaard Theoretical Economics 12 (1), 25-51, 2017 | 42 | 2017 |
Using economic theory to guide numerical analysis: Solving for equilibria in models of asymmetric first-price auctions TP Hubbard, R Kirkegaard, HJ Paarsch Computational Economics 42, 241-266, 2013 | 34 | 2013 |
A short proof of the Bulow-Klemperer auctions vs. negotiations result R Kirkegaard Economic Theory 28, 449-452, 2006 | 33 | 2006 |
Buy-out prices in online auctions: multi-unit demand R Kirkegaard, PB Overgaard University of Aarhus Economics Working Paper, 2003 | 31 | 2003 |
Handicaps in incomplete information all-pay auctions with a diverse set of bidders R Kirkegaard European Economic Review 64, 98-110, 2013 | 24 | 2013 |
Auctions versus negotiations revisited R Kirkegaard Department of Economics, University of Aarhus, Aarhus, 2004 | 20 | 2004 |
Pre-auction offers in asymmetric first-price and second-price auctions R Kirkegaard, PB Overgaard Games and Economic Behavior 63 (1), 145-165, 2008 | 19 | 2008 |
Ranking asymmetric auctions using the dispersive order R Kirkegaard Unpublished Manuscript, University of Guelph, 2011 | 17 | 2011 |
Asymmetric auctions with more than two bidders TP Hubbard, R Kirkegaard Department of Economics and Finance, University of Guelph, 2015 | 12 | 2015 |
Moral hazard and the spanning condition without the first-order approach R Kirkegaard Games and Economic Behavior 102, 373-387, 2017 | 10 | 2017 |
Ranking asymmetric auctions: Filling the gap between a distributional shift and stretch R Kirkegaard Games and Economic Behavior 85, 60-69, 2014 | 10 | 2014 |
Comparative statics and welfare in heterogeneous all-pay auctions: bribes, caps, and performance thresholds R Kirkegaard The BE Journal of Theoretical Economics 8 (1), 0000102202193517041417, 2008 | 9 | 2008 |
Participation fees vs. reserve prices in auctions with asymmetric or colluding buyers R Kirkegaard Economics Letters 89 (3), 328-332, 2005 | 9 | 2005 |
Incomplete information and rent dissipation in deterministic contests R Kirkegaard International Journal of Industrial Organization 31 (3), 261-266, 2013 | 8 | 2013 |
Bid-separation in asymmetric auctions TP Hubbard, R Kirkegaard Working Paper, 2019 | 7 | 2019 |
Preferential Treatment may Hurt: Another Application of the All $ Pay Auction R Kirkegaard Unpublished results, 2010 | 7 | 2010 |